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1  Solidarity Levies to fund development
Extracts from the message from the Norwegian Presidency of the Leading Group:
‘In view of the challenge of the Millennium Development Goals and the current 
gap between these goals and the financing available to reach them, Norway 
finds it imperative to help stimulate additional efforts, including through new and 
innovative mechanisms… Such levies can be easy to implement, their collection 
costs can be made minimal, national tax sovereignty need not be affected, and 
they…can be implemented without waiting for universal participation.’
‘… [in respect of the first solidarity development levy] proceeds will be used 
to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, through the new international 
drug purchase facility UNITAID. This facility, officially launched in New York on 
19 September 2006 will be hosted by the World Health Organisation… It is an 
important pilot project, which we believe will demonstrate the virtues of pooling 
resources mobilised by way of innovative financing schemes.’
While this message refers to the Airline Ticket Levy, this report comprehensively shows 
how the exact same analysis – easy implementation, minimal collection costs, no affect 
on national tax sovereignty and unilateral feasibility applies to a Currency Transaction 
Development Levy and calls on the Leading Group to respond to some of the most 
urgent development challenges by implementing the CTDL and leveraging the proceeds 
in a strategic way to target the ‘weak spots’ in the international development effort.
From the Norwegian Government’s Declaration on International Policy (The Soria Moria 
Declaration):
‘World poverty is an infringement of human worth, a violation of human rights 
and a threat to global security and the environment. The fight against poverty and 
for the right to economic development, democracy, human rights and sustainable 
development constitutes the greatest challenge for the world community and a 
principal task for the Government.’
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  Foreword
While this report examines an industry that is global and highly profitable, it is not 
anti-profit or anti-globalisation. That said, the banking sector’s profitability and global 
nature is an important backdrop to this study. The global airline industry has a good 
year when profits reach $2 billion. The global banking sector delivered $100 billion of 
profit in 2005 – a substantial part of which is related to globalisation: the financing of 
trade and arranging of capital flows. 
Today, government ability to raise national taxes is hampered by the globalisation of 
well-paid individuals and large corporations. At the same time, voters are demanding 
more global goods such as a clean environment and physical security. Consequently, 
we need to embrace global taxes that may in time replace national taxes. It would 
be odd if in doing so we end up taxing airlines but not banks. Separately, when 
considering how to finance initiatives that support those less positively affected by 
globalisation, it would seem fair that the main beneficiary of globalisation should make 
a contribution. Banks recognise this. They are involved in a number of initiatives to 
support education and community lending around the world. But these are often too 
small or diffuse to make more than a public relations impact. 
Unsurprisingly, given the sector’s size and profitability, it has one of the strongest lobbies. 
This lobby projects a view about the fragility and elusiveness of global finance that does 
not sit with today’s reality of highly regulated banking institutions. But in their lobbying 
they are often supported by politicians who generally have a low level of understanding 
of finance and a high level of fear of doing anything that might jeopardise the jobs, taxes 
and political contributions of the sector. Some of you will know me as a former leading 
currency analyst and senior manager of currency trading businesses at JP Morgan and 
State Street and I have witnessed much of this at first hand. 
It was with some apprehensiveness, however, that Intelligence Capital accepted the 
invitation to provide an objective and expert opinion on the feasibility of a unilateral 
currency levy. You never know where good research will take you until the end. I am 
now convinced that given the Basel Capital Adequacy Accord for internationally 
systemic banks, the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering and the new 
continuous linked, real-time settlements system for global foreign exchange, that a 
currency transaction development levy would now be relatively easy for any country 
to adopt, hard for any bank to evade and possible for most countries to implement 
unilaterally. I recommend this report to you.
By Avinash Persaud
President, Intelligence Capital Limited – former head of currency research at JP Morgan, 
UBS Philips and Drew and State Street Bank and former visiting scholar at the IMF.
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  Introduction
As we approach the half-way point for the achievement of many of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) the spotlight is shining ever more intently on the 
urgent need for new sources of revenue to pay for them. With the first international 
development duty launched, in the form of the ‘pilot’ solidarity levy on air travel, the 
momentum needs to continue to the implementation in quick succession of a second 
such initiative to provide another long term predictable source of additional finance.
Innovation is required not just in financing but also in delivery. UNITAID’s mission is to 
transform a situation of high cost drugs for the treatment of the few to low cost drugs 
for the care of the many. In so doing its potential value is exponentially greater than a 
simple addition of extra revenue. The choice of how and where the next new stream of 
finance is spent also needs to be to be similarly strategic.
The Core Group1 Governments rightly pride themselves on an international development 
policy that has, as one of its pillars, the tackling of global inequality which has risen 
rapidly in the latest phase of globalisation. For example President Chirac opened the 
Paris conference held in February 2006 in Paris stating that ‘despite the continuous 
increase in global wealth, a third of humankind still lives on less than a euro a day’, and 
that ‘…globalisation, far from bridging the (poverty) gap, is widening it even further’.
In this report, we offer some suggestions for tackling global inequality through concrete 
proposals for both raising substantial new revenue equitably and spending it in ways 
that strategically target the ‘weak spots’ in the international development effort.
The financial services industry has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation. 
Annual turnover in the global market for currencies, has, for instance, expanded from 
about $4 trillion in 1973 to $40 trillion in the mid 1980s to more than $450 trillion now – 
a more than 100 fold increase.2 Profits at financial services firms are also at a record high 
with the top two most profitable banks, Citibank and HSBC, posting more than $40 billion 
of profits between them in 2005 alone.
At the same time as industries such as airlines and financial services have benefited 
from globalisation, populations in many of the poorest countries, especially those in sub-
Saharan Africa, have been left behind – or worse, harmed. Average life expectancy in 
these countries is in fact down from 50 years in 1990 to 45 years now, just over half the 
almost 80-year life expectancy in countries such as Norway. The health, education and 
productivity problems caused by a lack of access to basics such as clean drinking water 
and sanitation facilities, the added decimation wrought by global pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS on the ability of the populations and systems in poor countries to cope, and 
the increased vulnerability linked to climate change, all threaten to undermine and, in 
fact, roll back the slow progress that has been made to date towards meeting the MDGs.
 1 The Core Group: Brazil, Chile, 
France, Norway and the UK 
– the principal countries at 
the heart of progress with 
UNITAID.
 2 Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) Survey of 
Foreign Exchange Markets
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In Section 2 we demonstrate in some detail how, by introducing a very small levy of 
less than a hundredth of one per cent on currency transactions, many countries can 
unilaterally generate substantial resources for development from those who can most 
afford to pay. Such a levy is simple and inexpensive to apply in this age of electronic 
transfers. Whilst this proposal is specific to the currency market, it can be generalised 
to apply to other financial markets many of which already pay some form of a levy.
The possible uses for this revenue that we propose in Section 4 have been shaped 
by the need to lever maximum results from the resources generated. The three 
potential areas for immediate financing that we have identified would generate 
positive additional outcomes towards the achievement of several seemingly unrelated 
development goals. First, provision of clean water and sanitation, as it is a 
foundation stone that underlies the ability to make meaningful progress with the vast 
majority of the MDGs. Second, providing human resources for health, because 
without sufficient trained health workers, medicines and infrastructure are simply not 
enough on their own to contain the raging pandemics of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. 
Third, providing a long term predictable source of funds to an expanded UN 
Central Emergency Response Fund, to create a more robust response to the growing 
threat of natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies.
I M P L E M E N T I N G  A  C U R R E N C Y  T R A N S A C T I O N  D E V E L O P M E N T  L E V Y
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 1 Progress and next steps: the general case for the Currency Transaction Development Levy
‘If current trends persist, there is a risk that many of the poorest countries 
will not be able to meet many of [the Millennium Development Goals]. 
Considering how far we have come, such a failure would mark a tragically 
missed opportunity… As I said in my March report: let us be clear about the 
costs of missing this opportunity: millions of lives that could have been saved 
will be lost; many freedoms that could have been secured will be denied; and 
we shall inhabit a more dangerous and unstable world.’
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 2005.
  Context
The ‘Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development’ have followed an 
important principle that lies at the core of recent progress with the Air Ticket Levy. 
Broadly speaking, those most benefiting from globalisation can provide additional, 
long-term, predictable financing to those so dramatically left behind. Airlines and 
financial services have been amongst the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation, 
having grown exponentially in the last few decades. The poor, especially in the Least 
Developed Countries, have fared badly, with average income levels and life expectancy 
in most sub-Saharan African countries lower now than 25 years ago.
  Progress – from words to action
One year ago innovative sources of development financing were aspirations. In the last 
few months alone UNITAID has been launched, swiftly followed by the International 
Financing Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm). Between them, these two ‘pilot’ initiatives 
will raise approximately $1.3 billion in the forthcoming year to both treat and prevent 
disease. Reducing the price of drugs and rolling out huge inoculation programmes 
have the potential for wide impact in addressing the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). It is clear, however, that to bridge the funding gap required to meet the MDGs, 
further complementary initiatives need to come on stream at the earliest opportunity. 
As we look to take the next step, it is important to concentrate on ‘innovative’ initiatives 
targeted at presently under-funded ‘weak spots’ in global development efforts. 
  The Currency Transaction Development Levy (CTDL) proposal and potential 
use of CTDL income
The proposal is for all foreign exchange (FX) transactions in a particular currency 
wherever they take place in the world to be subject to a development levy of 0.005%.
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In respect of where income could be channelled, we have chosen to target three 
potential sectors: 
● The provision of clean water and basic sanitation
● Greater funding for efforts to fight global pandemics and disease
● Provision of far greater support for poor countries affected by humanitarian 
emergencies. 
Progress in these areas could have a significant knock-on effect in the achievement of 
a number of sometimes seemingly unrelated development goals, and provide progress 
on a number of fronts such as reducing child and maternal mortality, reducing poverty 
and hunger, increasing gender equality and increasing access to education.
  The Leading Group and the MDGs
Since the MDGs were adopted in the year 2000, it has become increasingly clear 
that unless greater financial commitments were also made, the Goals would remain 
unrealised, condemning hundreds of millions to abject poverty, resulting in tens of 
millions of preventable deaths. It was the recognition that taking the ‘business as usual’ 
approach would mean the MDGs would not be realised, which galvanized many of 
the Leading group governments into action. ‘We are convinced that the Millennium 
Development Goals will simply not be achieved in many countries at present levels of 
aid flows.’ 3
It was also recognised that progress on increasing traditional official development 
assistance (ODA) would in itself not be enough to address the problem. This led to a 
search for ‘innovative mechanisms’, which were explored in detail in both the Chirac 
commission (Landau) report and the Action Against Hunger and Poverty report, both 
published in 2004.4 
Both reports emphasised the logic of transferring resources from the winners of 
globalisation to those who have been left behind and explored in some detail how 
implementing levies on the transport sector (such as air travel) and financial markets 
(such as currency markets) could help generate significant revenues and provide 
resources to make real progress on meeting development goals.
  From the winners of globalisation to those who have been left behind
President Chirac addressing the first Leading Group conference in Paris in February 
2006 stated that ‘despite the continuous increase in global wealth, a third of humankind 
still lives on less than a euro a day’, and that ‘…globalisation, far from bridging 
the [poverty] gap, is widening it even further’. Extreme inequality in the world is an 
undeniable phenomenon. Three hundred thousand of the most wealthy US citizens, less 
than 0.1% of the population, for example, earn more than one and a half billion poor 
people – a quarter of the world’s population.5 Almost 90% of the world’s wealth is now 
concentrated in the hands of less than 20% of its inhabitants.6
 3 Declaration on Innovative 
Sources of Financing, 
September 14 2005, New York
 4 Landau report: 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/
pdf/landau_report.pdf 
  Action Against Hunger and 
Poverty report, launched 
September 2004: 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/
pdf/Reportfieng.pdf
 5 Authors’ estimate using data 
from the World Bank and New 
York Times.
 6 Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: dirty 
money and how to renew the 
free-market system by Raymond 
Baker, Wiley (2005)
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While globalisation has meant for example that the financial services industry (and 
the players in it) have grown from strength to strength commanding an increasing 
share of global wealth, it has also meant that many of the world’s poorest and most 
vulnerable people – the least able to take advantage of globalisation – have been left 
behind. Worse, the ‘economic adjustment costs’ associated with globalisation have also 
increased deprivation resulting in a loss of livelihoods for many in some of the poorest 
countries. 
Global pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS have thrived in this age of easy travel, multiplying 
spread of the disease. Additionally, hundreds of millions of people, especially those 
who live in low-lying or semi-arid poor countries, will increasingly find their way of life, 
or even the mere preservation of their lives, threatened by the onset of global warming 
and climate change. Those who have generally not benefited from globalisation are 
paying the price of the economic activity and large-scale emissions generated by the 
rich world at the expense of the poor. 
It is for this reason that conversation concerning redistribution has been present in 
Leading Group discussions. It is also why imposing a levy on financial market trading 
has been one of the flagship proposals within both the Landau and Action Against 
Hunger and Poverty reports. 
  Taxing financial markets
‘The proposal to levy a tax on financial transactions at a very low rate would 
lead to the collection, on a stable and predictable basis, of a significant amount 
of resources for development, while not interfering with the normal functioning 
of the market.’
President Chirac of France, President Lula of Brazil, President Escobar of Chile and Prime Minister, 
Zapatero of Spain, from the Action Against Hunger and Poverty report.7
  The enormous size of these markets means they have a large revenue potential
Turnover in the global market for currencies, has, for instance, expanded from about 
$4 trillion in 1973 to $40 trillion in the mid-1980s to $450 trillion in 2004 – a more than 
100-fold increase. Turnover in world equity (stock) markets has registered a seven-fold 
increase to $51 trillion in a period of just 12 years since 19938 and the wealth held in 
the global bond market has increased more than three-fold to almost $60 trillion now9 
over the same period.
Just skimming these vast financial markets, taking a tiny slice off the top, has the 
potential to generate billions of dollars that can be redistributed to save lives and 
achieve sustainable development. 
 7 Action Against Hunger and 
Poverty report, launched 
September 2004: 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/
pdf/Reportfieng.pdf
 8 World Federation of Exchanges
 9 Bank for International 
Settlements, www.bis.org
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  Small transaction levies do not damage financial markets and are simple 
to implement 
Applying small transaction levies, of the order of a few hundredths of one per cent, can 
raise vast sums of money, and because these transfers are carried out electronically, it 
makes implementation simple and each transaction traceable. Many such transaction 
taxes already operate successfully and raise billions of dollars of revenue for countries 
as varied as the UK and Brazil.
The existing transaction tax regimes show that financial markets are comfortably able 
to shoulder the burden of such levies especially when the rate is kept low. Liquidity and 
market structure are not affected adversely and income generation is predictable and 
stable in the long term.
Such levies are collected electronically at minimal cost, on average about 50 times less 
than the corresponding costs for the collection of income taxes. Once the collection has 
been plumbed into the electronic system it is automatic and very difficult to avoid.
  Currency markets – principle reasons to implement a 
development levy
‘A tax on foreign exchange transactions is technically feasible.’ 
President Chirac of France, President Lula of Brazil, President Escobar of Chile and Prime Minister, 
Zapatero of Spain, from the Action Against Hunger and Poverty report.10
  The growth of profits
The financial services industry is responsible for the vast majority of currency 
transactions. It has seen record levels of profits with the top three banks earning more 
than $50 billion between them in 2005. Profits on currency trading are not always 
disclosed separately but in 2003, the latest year for which figures are available, the 
same banks made almost $5 billion from currency trading alone.11 It is important to 
remember that participation in the currency markets confers enormous advantage on 
financial institutions over and above the direct profits generated from FX trading. 
  The incidence of the levy
Most transactions in the FX markets are conducted between banks themselves or with 
other large players in the financial services industry. Transactions with individuals 
(for overseas travel for example) constitute less than 0.1% of total transactions and 
trade-related transactions amount to less than 10%. A significant proportion of the tax 
burden is thus likely to be borne at least initially by the financial services industry itself 
with some of the costs being passed on to trade related transactions. The financial 
services industry is disproportionately used by the richer segments of the society so 
 10 Action Against Hunger and 
Poverty report, launched 
September 2004: 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/
pdf/Reportfieng.pdf
 11 FX Week, June 21st 2004
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the tax incidence is likely to be socially progressive and is unlikely to affect the majority 
of the population in any tangible way. The incidence of the levy is discussed in greater 
detail later in the report.
  Other taxes
Other financial markets such as stock markets and bond markets already pay a trans-
action levy in many countries. In the UK, for example, a 0.5% stamp duty is levied on 
the purchase of stocks. This generates substantial revenues of about $7 billion every 
year. Countries such as Germany, Belgium and Switzerland tax bond transactions. Many 
countries in Latin America, such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela currently levy 
a generalised financial transaction tax. A stamp duty or levy on currency transactions is 
simply a natural extension to the financial transaction taxes that already exist.
  Technical issues
The CTDL can be levied unilaterally on all FX transactions in a particular currency 
wherever they take place in the world. The levy can be collected in an inexpensive and 
efficient way at the point of transaction settlement through either the Continuous Linked 
Settlement Bank (CLS Bank) or the real time gross settlement mechanisms (RTGS) that 
are run for all major currencies by their respective central banks. The fact that all FX 
transactions are electronic makes collection cheaper and evasion very difficult. A levy 
that includes the euro will need a consensus from all euro area members. However, 
countries such as the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark could implement 
a CTDL unilaterally for little expense in cost, time and effort, if they so wished.
  Quality not just quantity
Taxing financial transactions such as currency transactions to fund development 
is important not just in terms of the increase in quantity of money raised but also 
because of improvement in the quality of aid disbursed to poorest countries.
Current aid disbursements are often short-term and unpredictable, which is wholly 
unsuitable when dealing with long-term needs such as building infrastructures, assisting 
reconstruction or supporting people with illnesses, such as HIV/AIDS. A predictable 
and locked-in source of revenue such as a levy on currency transactions would provide 
a long-term source of income that could bypass the annual budget wrangling of ODA 
allocation. An additional advantage of taxing currency markets would be that because 
of their rapid growth they are likely to provide increasing amounts of revenue. Thus 
taxing financial transactions for development could also help substantially increase the 
effectiveness of development aid.
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  The CTDL is not the Tobin tax but a solidarity levy
It is important to clarify that the levy that we are proposing on currency transactions is 
not the same as a Tobin tax, an idea with which it is often mixed up.
James Tobin’s original 1970s idea was for a tax to alter motivation in the foreign 
exchange market. The purpose of his tax was to impede daily currency trading12 and to 
discourage speculative activity. When he advanced his proposal the currency market 
had a daily value of $18 billion, it is now worth almost $2,000 billion per day. The rate 
he proposed was 1%, 200 times the 0.005% rate set out here, and the income was not 
designated to a specific purpose, such as development. Tobin was actively seeking to 
alter the structure of the market through the imposition of such a tax.
The Currency Transaction Development Levy (CTDL), the focus of this report, is entirely 
different. Its raison d’etre is as a financing instrument for development. Its rate is 
designed specifically not to hamper normal market operations but instead to skim a 
tiny fraction of the volume traded. The two proposals have but one element in common, 
they are both associated with currency. The CTDL fundamentally differs from the Tobin 
tax, therefore, in that it is born of a different time, proposed at a different rate and 
designed for a different purpose. 
  The CTDL – an ideal levy
The CTDL is an ideal levy providing a substantial long term, predictable income stream 
from a financial market, which is not just the largest in the world but has grown 
exponentially with the advent of globalisation and continues to do so. This revenue 
can be raised cheaply with little risk of avoidance and without altering the structure 
and operation of the market. Resources can be used to address the weak spots in the 
architecture of meeting the Millennium Development Goals. This offers some redress to 
the imbalance of globalisation by having its winners contribute to those that have not 
been so fortunate. 
 12 His intention was to ‘throw 
sand in the wheels of 
our excessively efficient 
international money markets’. 
Professor James Tobin (1978) 
‘A Proposal for Monetary 
Reform’, Eastern Economic 
Journal, based on Janeway 
Lectures, Princeton, 1972.
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 2 Implementing a Currency Transaction Development Levy 
  Financial Transaction Taxes (FTTs)
Taxes on financial transactions, such as taxes on share trading, bond trading, house 
purchases or bank debits have a long history and most have operated successfully for 
many years raising substantial amounts of revenue with no apparent negative impact 
on the market. In fact all of the G10 countries except Canada have levied financial 
transaction taxes at some time. Of these, the United States13, UK, France, Belgium 
and Switzerland have existing FTT regimes. The other G10 members have (relatively 
recently) dismantled FTTs they had: Japan (1999), Italy (1998), Sweden and Germany 
(1991) and the Netherlands (1990). 
However, while there has been some movement towards the removal/reduction of 
transaction taxes, this is counterbalanced by recently imposed FTT regimes in India 
(2004), Peru (2003), Argentina and Colombia (2000), Ecuador (1999), Greece (1998) 
and Finland (1997). In fact, Greece doubled its transaction tax on share trading in 
1999. The table in the Appendix provides a more comprehensive list of various financial 
transaction taxes.
Common objections to the introduction of financial transaction taxes are that they will: 
a) distort the market and b) drive investors/financiers out of the economy or sector to 
other, untaxed economies. The reality, however, is often very different. In the UK, for 
example, a stamp duty on share transactions generates as much as $7 billion every 
year – at a collection cost that is 50 times cheaper than the cost for collecting income 
tax. Despite having this 0.5% (50 basis points) stamp duty on share transactions, the 
UK continues to be one of the top financial centres and the London Stock Exchange one 
of the premier exchanges in the world.
In 2003 the Peruvian government introduced a 0.1% general financial transaction tax, 
with the aim of raising finance for the education sector. At this time, the national and 
international financial press, concerned private investors and international financial 
institutions such as the IMF predicted severe negative consequences to the Peruvian 
economy. In particular, they feared that bank deposits would be withdrawn, adversely 
affecting the availability of credit in the economy, and thereby restraining growth rates. 
Figure 1 overleaf illustrates what actually happened.
 13 In the US, Security transaction 
taxes apply to transactions 
in publicly traded shares 
and exchange traded futures 
and options and the revenue 
raised is used to cover the 
cost of the operations of 
financial regulators such as 
the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).
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As can be seen, far from reducing bank deposits and therefore credit, the period 
following the introduction of the financial transaction tax saw both bank deposits and 
access to credit increase steadily. 
In fact, for many of the transaction taxes introduced in recent years such as in 
Colombia and Argentina, the financial sector has adapted itself to the transaction tax 
with no major repercussions, and this is despite the fact that the rate at which these 
taxes are levied are many multiples of the CTDL rate we propose in this report. The tax 
rates levied are in the range of 20 to 80 basis points and raise substantial amounts 
of revenue every year at very low collection costs and with few problems of evasion. 
Moreover, the taxes have been collected mainly by electronic means through banks at 
minimal cost on behalf of the government. Income has ranged between 0.3% and 3.5% 
of GDP or 1.5% to 26.7% of total tax revenue in different countries, at different times.14 
In summary, here are some key elements of FTTs:
● It is not unusual for financial transactions to be taxed in some form or other – this 
ranges from the duty on share trades in the UK, the tax on corporate bond trading in 
Germany and the generalised levy on financial transactions in Peru
● Where FTTs have been levied, financial markets have generally adopted them with no 
major repercussions
● FTTs raise substantial amounts of revenue
● In most cases, this income is collected electronically at the point of settlement with 
minimum cost to the governments
● Evasion has not proved a serious problem.
One of the key points that emerge from this discussion is that the foreign exchange 
market is unusual for not yet being taxed. Given that it is the largest financial market 
in the world, a levy on foreign exchange trading would be expected to raise substantial 
amounts of revenue provided a suitable collection mechanism could be designed at the 
point of trade settlement. With the tax designed at an appropriate low rate it would not 
have an adverse impact on the day to day operation of the market. The income could 
FIGURE 1
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 14 Bank Debit Taxes in Latin 
America: an analysis of recent 
trends, IMF Working Paper 67 
(2001)
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then be mobilised to such ends as the implementing government(s) should wish, such 
as international development.
We present here a proposal for countries to unilaterally implement a very small levy 
on currency transactions and collect the proceeds using existing systems of electronic 
settlement. 
  Our Currency Transaction Development Levy proposal
The proposal is for all foreign exchange transactions in a particular currency wherever 
they take place in the world to be subject to a levy of 0.005%. The past two decades 
have seen significant changes in the way FX transactions are settled both nationally 
using Real Time Gross Settlement systems and internationally using the Continuous 
Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank (see Box 2: International payment and settlement systems). 
Therefore, whilst Central Banks have responsibility for ensuring the effective functioning 
of systemically important country-based payments systems, a country is not an island 
in this respect. Rather, it operates in an interconnected – and interdependent – global 
network of central banks and national payment systems, and cooperates in the 
oversight of cross-border payment systems, such as the CLS Bank.
These developments have today made a unilaterally implemented CTDL feasible. 
A leading scholar in this field is Professor Rodney Schmidt, who put the issue as follows 
in the year 2000:
‘…the infrastructure for settling foreign exchange trades is increasingly formal, 
centralized and regulated. This is due to new technology, subject to increasing returns 
to scale, and to cooperation between trading and central banks to reduce settlement 
risk. Settling a foreign exchange trade requires at least two payments, one of each 
of the currencies traded. Settlement risk is eliminated when payment obligations are 
matched and traced to the original trade, and then payments are made simultaneously. 
The technology and institutions now in place to support this make it possible to identify 
and tax gross foreign exchange payments, whichever financial instrument is used 
to define the trade, wherever the parties to the trade are located, and wherever the 
ensuing payments are made.’ 15
‘The payment system is an important part of a country’s economic and financial 
infrastructure. Smoothly functioning payment systems make it possible to execute safe and 
timely payment transactions – for the settlement of goods and services purchases, capital 
transfers, securities and foreign exchange trading,…and these transactions are made by 
private customers, banks enterprises and government agencies. These transactions result 
in claims between the payers’ and payees’ banks, and these claims are settled through 
the banks’ accounts in Norges bank. Banks and the central bank are thus the core of the 
payment system.’ 16
BOX 1
The importance of 
the settlement system 
and central bank role 
in Norway
 15 Schmidt (2000)
 16 Norges Bank’s oversight and 
supervision of the payment 
system, Norges Bank Economic 
Bulletin 2002 Q1 (2002)
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The last two decades have seen significant changes in the practice of payments and 
settlement systems globally. As overseeing authorities have sought to reduce settlement 
risk and enhance systemic efficiency, Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) systems have 
given way to Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) systems, where – at least domestically 
– settlement risk is effectively eliminated due to the use of payment versus payment 
(PvP) and delivery versus payment (DvP). In general terms, advances in IT have led 
to greater uniformity, as heterodox forms have gradually been replaced by a more 
homogenous approach based on commonly used technical platforms, thereby greatly 
reducing costs through increased efficiency. Major Large Value Payment Systems (LVPS) in 
developed countries are increasingly interdependent. They rely on the same technological 
infrastructures, which ensure that this interdependence functions smoothly and effectively. 
The messaging function pioneered by SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications) has become central to this process, as economies of scale 
considerations have made it increasingly sensible for all global players to use the 
same system. SWIFT, which is owned by the finance industry, now supplies messaging 
services to more than 8,000 financial institutions in 206 countries and territories, and 
thus accounts for an important part of the financial infrastructure both nationally and 
internationally. While the Norges Bank, Bank of England and the European Central Bank 
do not oversee SWIFT’s activities separately, they lend support to the oversight carried 
out by the Belgian central bank under the auspices of the G10 group in the Bank for 
International Settlements.17
For the purpose of this report it is important to understand how currency settlement 
operates. In the UK, for example, the Clearing House Automated Payment System 
(CHAPS) is a key body in this regard. CHAPS is the organisation through which most 
high-value wholesale payments are processed, and it operates an RTGS system. Sterling 
currency transactions are settled either through CHAPS or the Continuous Linked 
Settlement (CLS) Bank. 
The Norwegian equivalent is the Norges Bank’s (the Central Bank of Norway) own 
settlement system, NBO. The Norges bank has also authorised two other payment and 
settlement systems – DnB NOR Bank ASA and Norwegian Interbank Clearing System 
(NICS) – but these settle smaller amounts and, in fact, operate under the supervision of 
the central bank.
For the settlement of large value euro transactions the European Central Bank (ECB) 
operates the TARGET system which interlinks the national level RTGS systems of the 
euro area’s 15 countries to provide automated settlement. This was designed to provide 
common procedures – especially messaging functions which allow payment orders (for 
settlement) to move seamlessly between the national level RTGS systems.
FX related euro transactions are mostly settled thorough the CLS or the TARGET systems 
and in the case of the Norwegian krone through the NBO or through the CLS.
Internationally, cross-border FX Herstatt18 Risk – one of the last remaining outposts of 
settlement risk in the global financial sector – has also been addressed with the launch 
of the CLS Bank, which enables FX transactions in different time-zones to be settled on 
a PvP basis. As with national Large Value Payment Systems, this effectively eliminates 
settlement risk. 
BOX 2
International payment 
and settlement systems
 17 Annual Report on Payment 
Systems 2005, Norges Bank 
(May 2006), and Bank for 
International Settlements
 18 On 26th June 1974 at 15:30 
CET, the German authorities 
closed Bankhaus Herstatt, a 
middle-sized bank with a large 
FX business. Prior to the closure, 
however, a number of Herstatt’s 
counterparty banks had 
irrevocably paid Deutsche marks 
into Herstatt but, as US financial 
markets had just opened, had 
not yet received their dollar 
payments in return. This failure 
triggered a ripple effect through 
global payment and settlement 
systems, particularly in New 
York. Ultimately, this fed into 
New York’s multilateral netting 
system, which over the following 
three days, saw net payments 
going through the system 
decline by 60% (BIS 2002). This 
settlement risk became known 
as Herstatt Risk and has been 
addressed by the development 
of Real Time Gross Settlement 
(RTGS) systems and the recent 
introduction of the Continuous 
Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank.
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To be effective a CTDL would need to have the following attributes:
● It could be implemented relatively easily and cheaply, using existing market 
infrastructure and networks
● It would capture the vast majority of transactions carried out in a particular currency 
globally
● It would be set at a sufficiently modest level as to neither distort the market nor 
provide incentives for financial institutions to move outside current systems in order 
to avoid paying the CTDL. 
Below we explain in some detail how such a CTDL would work using examples of the 
UK sterling and Norwegian krone, and also how the proposal meets each of these 
three criteria.
  Implementing a CTDL
Since the launch of the CLS Bank in 2002, a growing share of FX transactions have 
migrated to it. Today it is estimated that a little over 60% of all global sterling, krone 
and euro trades are conducted through the CLS system.19 Of the remainder, the 
overwhelming majority are processed through the UK’s CHAPS, the Norges Banks’ 
NBO and the ECB’s TARGET System for their respective currencies. These currency 
specific systems are therefore directly connected to the CLS member banks, and 
through this link also connected with the other major national RTGS systems. 
To be effective, therefore, the CTDL must be implemented at a number of levels. The most 
straightforward of these is through the CLS Bank. As pointed out above, more than 60% 
of all sterling, krone and euro transactions are settled in the CLS system, where it would 
be a straightforward task to identify them. For example, the UK Treasury has accepted 
the validity of this point, not least because it would be practically straightforward and 
that, if implemented in the UK, would have to be adhered to by the CLS Bank.
‘Technically, it is possible to apply a unilateral sterling CTT via CLS… CLS Bank settle 
in fifteen currencies, and in doing so must apply the relevant laws in each jurisdiction 
– including, for example, a unilateral sterling currency transaction tax.’20
Having accounted for more than 60% of all sterling, krone and euro FX trades, the 
CTDL must also address the remainder – though, as described above, this ‘remainder’ 
is likely to become an ever-smaller proportion in the years ahead. By far the most 
important organisations, in this regard, are the LVPS – CHAPS, NBO and TARGET for 
each of the three regions specifically. Here, the developments in the LVPS sector are key 
to the feasibility of implementing an effective CTDL.
  How would the CTDL be raised in practice?
In Norway, for example, we can imagine a situation where NorwayBank1 wishes to 
purchase a Norwegian financial asset from NorwayBank2. If the sale price is agreed, 
NorwayBank1 sends a SWIFTNet message to the relevant LVPS with an instruction to 
debit its settlement account at the Norges Bank, and to credit the settlement account 
 19 CLS Issue Brief October 2006, 
assuming that the CLS settles 
the same proportion of trades 
in all currencies.
 20 HM Treasury (2004), written 
response to points raised by 
Stamp Out Poverty
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of NorwayBank2. At the same time, NorwayBank2 sends a SWIFT message requesting 
ownership of the relevant asset be transferred to NorwayBank1. SWIFT then matches 
the two messages, and after requesting and receiving confirmation from both banks, 
transfers both the krone amount and the ownership of the asset. In this instance, both 
sides of the transaction are in krone and therefore represent a domestic transaction 
that does not attract the CTDL.21
Internationally, however, the situation is rather different. Suppose NorwayBank1 wishes 
to buy US dollars for krone. NorwayBank1 makes an offer to USBank1 (through any 
of a number of possible channels) and the offer is accepted. As with the domestic 
example, NorwayBank1 then sends a SWIFT message to the LVPS requesting it to debit 
its settlement account at the Norges Bank for the appropriate quantity of krone, and 
to credit the account of NorwayBank2 at the central bank (we assume that USBank1 
keeps its krone holdings with an account at NorwayBank2 as an escrow account, which 
reflects standard international banking practice). At the same time, USBank1 sends a 
message to its LVPS requesting that the appropriate dollar amount is transferred from 
its balance to that of USBank2 (again, we assume that NorwayBank1 keeps its US 
dollar holdings in an account with USBank2). 
In Norway, SWIFT requests confirmation of the trade from NorwayBank1, upon receipt 
of which it debits NorwayBank1’s account at the Norges Bank, and credits that for 
NorwayBank2. Unlike the domestic transaction, however, it is unable to match the 
message from NorwayBank1 to another krone-based message in the system. Therefore, 
although domestically the PvP process requires matching of trades and removes 
settlement risk, an international FX trade cannot be settled on a PvP basis in a national 
system such as NBO, as each leg of the trade takes place in different domestic LVPS, often 
operating in different time-zones. It is this failure to match both legs of a transaction in 
krone that identifies the transaction as an FX trade, upon which the CTDL can be levied.
In this way a CTDL could feasibly be implemented unilaterally in Norway, with the 
overwhelming majority of krone transactions undertaken globally being identified 
through the CLS system and the NBO. As the stylised example above makes clear, this 
is based on PvP systems in domestic LVPS, as well as the PvP approach employed by the 
CLS Bank. The ‘oil’ that lubricates this process and makes it possible, however, is the 
ubiquity of standardised messaging formats within the financial sector. 
A key feature of the various interlinked systems through which FX transactions can 
be settled is their use of the SWIFTNet messaging system. Importantly, SWIFT also 
provides messaging services for major electronic FX trading platforms such as FXall, 
as well as for the major global bilateral and multilateral FX netting systems, past and 
present. This global reach offers the chance to further extend the scope of the CTDL, 
and ensure that all FX related sterling trades in CHAPS, krone trades in NBO, and euro 
trades in TARGET, are identified. 
Within each of the systems in which it operates, SWIFTNet provides secure payment 
messaging between members through its FIN system and, crucially, has a dedicated 
message form – the MT300 – which is used to confirm individual FX trades. That 
is, whether in the CLS system, CHAPS, NBO, TARGET, FXall or a multilateral netting  21 This stylised example is an 
adaptation of that used in 
Schmidt (2001).
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system, an FX trade is confirmed between the counterparties by means of a SWIFTNet 
FIN MT300 message, or one of its variants.
The MT300 message is initially exchanged by or on behalf of the parties that have 
agreed to a foreign exchange contract. The fact that MT300 messages also provide 
notification of amendments to contracts and cancellations of previously held 
confirmation is important for the purposes of this proposal, as it ensures that the CTDL 
is only levied on sterling, krone or euro FX transactions in the form in which they are 
ultimately transacted. Also, because MT300 messages confirm individual FX trades, 
they precede any subsequent bilateral netting process that may occur, after which 
identifying the individual trades concerned may not be possible. 
Within each MT300 message, a number of fields must be completed. For an FX trade, 
the currencies concerned and the amounts bought and sold are included here. In the 
Mandatory Subsequence sections of the MT300 message, the relevant sections are B1 
(Tag 32b) for the currency and amount bought, and B2 (Tag 33b) for the currency and 
amount sold. Consequently, all the information needed to identify sterling, krone or 
euro transactions is already in place. No dedicated infrastructure is required. 
The MT300 messaging system can therefore capture the lion’s share of sterling, krone 
or euro transactions in the ‘traditional’ FX market. However, this still leaves the area of 
the OTC derivatives market. In one important respect, this market is also covered by the 
MT300 messaging series, which is used to confirm that FX options have been executed. In 
this case, MT305 and MT306 are used as messaging formats. All other FX OTC derivative 
contracts are contained within the third category of SWIFTStandard messaging formats, 
which range from MT300 to MT341 and from MT350 to MT399. As with the traditional 
market, messages require the currency, amount and counter parties to be identified within 
the message, as well as the facility to amend or cancel contracts. 
The next piece of ‘plumbing’ is to gather relevant messages of this form in a central 
location, to enable the CTDL to be levied. Again, however, it is possible to ‘piggy-back’ 
upon existing networks by using the SWIFTNet FIN Copy messaging function. The 
majority of recipients of SWIFT FIN Copy messages are central banks, as the messages 
facilitate settlement in the centralised RTGS systems. The ideal template is FINInform, 
where copied messages are triggered to the central bank depending on either the 
identity of the parties or the type of message sent. 
A key aspect of the proposal is therefore to establish a SWIFTInform messaging 
service, which is triggered by the sending of an MT300–MT399 FX message, in either 
the traditional or the OTC derivatives market. In this instance, a copy of parts of the 
message – currency, volume and counterparties – is automatically sent to, for example, 
the Bank of England for every FX transaction involving sterling. As with all aspects 
of the proposal, this process would be automated and would require no dedicated 
infrastructure. The next section deals with how the CTDL would be collected with the 
help of the information gathered.
The following diagrams use the example of sterling transactions to highlight how the 
CTDL would be executed in practice based on existing settlement infrastructure.
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  Collecting the CTDL and preventing avoidance
Once identified in the manner described above, collecting the CTDL would be a 
relatively straightforward process. To be able to participate in the CLS system, financial 
institutions must hold an account with the CLS Bank. However, in practice, UK-based 
CLS Bank members actually hold their accounts within the Bank of England, Norway-
based members with the Norges Bank and euro area members with their respective 
central banks. These accounts can then be credited and debited by the institution in 
accordance with their liquidity requirements for CLS Bank. To collect the CTDL from the 
CLS system, therefore, the levy could be directly taken from the relevant accounts.
Similarly, in order to be a member of CHAPS, NBO or euro area RTGS systems, a 
financial institution must hold a settlement account at the respective central bank. 
Therefore, once the tax to be paid is identified and traced to the RTGS member, it can 
be transferred from the relevant settlement account held at the central bank to the 
account of the finance ministry also held at the central bank.
The SWIFT messaging system in general, and the FINInform Copying function in 
particular, is completely automated on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, though the 
relevant systems would have to be slightly modified to facilitate tax identification and 
tax-take from the appropriate centrally held accounts, the changes would be relatively 
minor. Furthermore, once the fixed, start-up costs were met, the marginal cost of 
operating the system would be very low. 
Direct members of both the CLS System and country-level LVPS are relatively few in 
number, with a significant proportion of all trades being undertaken by members on 
behalf of their third-party customers. Whilst these market participants would not be 
directly taxed, they would be affected by the CTDL, which would be directly reflected 
in the spread charged them by the CLS Bank/CHAPS/NBO/other RTGS members in 
exchange for executing their FX business.
The remaining sterling, krone or euro trades undertaken – by corporations, for example 
– would still be identified by use of the SWIFTNet messaging service described. 
Furthermore, these trades would be settled by correspondent banks on behalf of 
the underlying corporate. These correspondent banks would hold accounts with the 
respective central banks, the CLS Bank, or both. Consequently, such FX trades would 
ultimately also incur the CTDL. 
  Running costs
On average SWIFT messages cost approximately £0.067 (0.82 krone or 0.1 euro) each. 
The CLS Bank settles 200,000 transactions a day, which is more than half of all FX 
trades. To capture the entire FX market, therefore, would equate to about 400,000 
messages a day. The following table lists some of the estimated costs for implementing 
SWIFT copy messaging for the three currencies under discussion.22  22 It assumes that the total running costs for the respective 
central banks (including setting 
up their own systems) would 
be on average two to three 
times the amount that it would 
cost to generate the additional 
SWIFT copy messages.
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Having established the feasibility of a) identifying FX transactions, and b) collecting 
the CTDL, the final question relates to the appropriate level at which to set the levy. 
The objective is not to maximise income per se, but to strike a balance between raising 
sufficient revenue to make a contribution to meeting the MDGs, and avoiding market 
distortions.
In 2004, the sterling, krone and euro accounted respectively for 8.5%, 0.7% and 18.6% 
of all FX trades globally, out of an average daily total of $1,880 billion. This equates to 
a potentially taxable daily total of around $160 billion, $13 billion and $350 billion for 
the three currencies respectively. 
The table below illustrates the potential annual revenue from differing CTDL rates 
assuming 260 trading days in the year.23 
As can be seen, a 1% tax could hypothetically raise hundreds (or tens) of billions. 
However, a CTDL at such a level would certainly have a distorting effect on the market, 
reducing volumes traded drastically. At the 0.10% level the annual revenue would 
still, theoretically, be substantial. However, it is likely that a 10 basis points (bp) tax 
rate would also have a sizeable impact on the market as the typical market spreads 
(differences between the sale and purchase price) are below this level. In particular, it 
may provide a disincentive to trade, with the result that transaction volumes could fall, 
with the income from the levy therefore also falling by the equivalent amount. 
A more realistic rate at which to set the CTDL would be 0.01%, or 1 basis point, where 
annual revenues would be in the order of $4.15 billion, $34 billion and $9.09 billion 
for the sterling, krone and euro, respectively. While it is likely that a 1 basis point CTDL 
would not cause major disruptions in the respective currency market, this rate is not 
proposed. Rather, the proposal is to set the CTDL at half of one basis point: 0.005%. 
At this low rate, it is difficult to argue that the tax would distort the market. It would, 
however, still raise substantial amounts of revenue.
SSD rate GBP market NOK market Euro market
1% $415.48bn $34.22bn $909.17bn
0.1% $41.55bn $3.42bn $90.92bn
0.01% $4.15bn $0.34bn $9.09bn
0.005% $2.08bn $0.17bn $4.55bn
TABLE 2
Estimates of potential 
annual revenue 
generated at various 
tax rates
GBP market NOK market Euro market
SWIFT transactions daily 
average $67,600 $5,600 $148,800
Additional copy messages 
annual cost $1.178mn $1.190mn $3.888mn
Approx total annual costs $2–3mn $2–3mn $8–12mn
TABLE 1
Estimated costs for 
implementing SWIFT 
copy messaging
 23 These revenue estimates are 
highly conservative and based 
only on the turnover in the 
traditional FX market which 
was reported by the BIS to be 
$1,880 billion per day. The 
OTC derivatives market is 
worth $2,410 billion per day 
and the exchange traded FX 
product market is worth $4,657 
billion per day. Including these 
markets can potentially treble 
the revenue estimates.
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Based on a conservative assumption we, therefore, estimate that the CTDL would 
produce annual revenues of $2.08 billion, $170 million and $4.55 billion, for the 
UK, Norway and the Eurozone region, respectively. Of course, this assumes that the 
implementation of the CTDL has no impact upon volume traded. Given the extremely 
low level of the tax, this is not an unreasonable assumption. However, in order to err 
on the side of caution, we assume a 2.5% reduction in the volume of currencies traded, 
and this would amount to an annual receipt of $2.03 billion, $167 million and $4.43 
billion. The 2.5% figure is based on a report written for the UN on the revenue raising 
potential of currency transaction taxes (Nissanke, 2003).24,25 
As with other taxes, the respective tax authorities would be the agency with statutory 
power to collect the CTDL. The mechanics of collection, however, would be greatly 
eased by taxable funds being held in accounts at the central banks. For example, in 
the UK, it is already possible to pay taxes through the CHAPS system, which suggests 
that the simplest method of collection would be for the tax to be paid directly into a 
dedicated revenue authority CHAPS account, also held at the Bank of England and 
have equivalent arrangements in the case of other currencies.
In this entire discussion we have chosen to be highly conservative by focusing only 
on the traditional market and ignoring the OTC derivative market to arrive at our 
estimates of potential revenue. This market trades $2,317 billion worth of currencies 
every day, a sum even larger than the traditional market. As seen from the discussion 
earlier in this section, implementing a levy on this market is no more complicated 
than implementing it for the traditional market. Hence, assuming that the proportion 
of traditional and OTC trades in a particular currency are roughly similar, the actual 
potential revenue available from a 0.005% levy on sterling, krone and euro transactions 
is at least double the amount we have calculated thus far.
  Economic footprint
The ‘economic footprint’ of the CTDL would, in the first instance, fall upon the large 
financial institutions that are members of the CLS Bank and RTGS system’s such as NBO 
and CHAPS. These are primarily international banks and the largest domestic banks. 
If this was as far as the process went, there is little doubt that major international banks 
could comfortably absorb this as shown by Tables 3 and 4 overleaf. 
Large international banks dominate the global FX market. Together with the large 
domestic financial institutions in the respective currency areas, these institutions 
account for the vast majority of the FX trades in all currencies including sterling, krone 
and euro. These banks’ trades are ultimately undertaken for a wide range of clients – 
for example, the CLS Bank estimate that an average of 200,000 separate transactions 
are settled every day, which gives some sense of the number of ultimate participants in 
the global FX market. 
Let us briefly examine the general incidence and impact on corporations of a CTDL 
on sterling. As we have seen, the CLS bank processes an average of 200,000 FX 
transactions every day. In line with the global picture, we assume that 17.5% of these 
have sterling on one side of the trade, which gives 34,000 sterling transactions in 
 24 Some of the fall in volume 
could reflect a migration to 
stock exchanges, where FX 
deals can be executed by 
trading stocks denominated 
in different currencies. This 
practice already occurs to some 
extent, though its potential 
growth is limited. However, 
traded stocks are also settled 
in centralised systems of the 
kind described in this report, 
and could therefore be brought 
within the ambit of the CTDL 
relatively easily. 
 25 More clarity will be gained 
on this issue, when Professor 
Rodney Schmidt’s ongoing 
research into the price 
elasticities of FX volumes is 
published. 
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the CLS system per day. However, the CLS Bank settles only around half of all FX 
transactions, which suggests a global figure of 68,000 sterling trades per day. Over 
a year, therefore, we can estimate the total number of sterling transactions to be 
of the order of 17.7 million. The impact of the CTDL would be spread very widely 
internationally with tens of thousands of participants carrying out the 17.7 million 
transactions. The cost would be in the region of $117 per trade, on an average trade 
size of a little over $2 million. 
For corporations, however, the situation is clearly different. For example, the UK exports 
somewhere in the region of $380 billion worth of goods and services per year. Based 
on the profit margins of UK companies from 1990 to 2002, we assume an average 
margin of 10%.28 Ten per cent of $380 billion is $38 billion, which we take as a rough 
estimate of the annual profit of the UK’s export sector. The impact of the CTDL on 
UK corporates would be somewhere in the region of $115 million. Consequently, the 
impact on UK exporters would be just 0.3% of their annual profits, which is very small 
when set against the many other factors that influence company profitability. For 
example, over the past ten years, UK companies’ average profitability has fluctuated 
by up to 10% per year. It is therefore clearly the case that when compared to the 
impact of changes to general business conditions, and movements in indicators such 
as interest rates and the sterling exchange rate, a CTDL of 0.005% will have hardly any 
discernable impact. This analysis is also applicable to the impact of the CTDL on the 
euro and the krone.
Bank Annual profit 2005
Citigroup $25bn
HSBC $16bn
UBS $11bn
JP Morgan Chase $8bn
Barclays $7bn
Goldman Sachs $6bn
ABN Amro $5bn
Merrill Lynch $5bn
Morgan Stanley $5bn
Deutsche Bank $4bn
Bank Annual profit 2005
Nordea $4bn
DnB NOR $2bn
Handelsbanken $2bn
Skandinaviska $1bn
TABLE 4
2005 profits for major 
banks in Norway 27
TABLE 3
2005 profits for major 
international banks 26
 26 US banks’ data: 
http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/
full_list/index.html
Non-US banks’ data: each 
institution’s consolidated 
financial statements 2005. 
US Dollar figures for non-US 
banks converted at exchange 
rate of 3/1/2006 – rounded 
figures.
 27 Annual statements of major 
global banks and Norwegian 
banks – rounded figures.
 28 See Citron and Walton (2002)
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Consequently, we estimate that at least half of the impact of the CTDL will eventually 
be passed on by banks to their global clients in the form of a slightly higher spread. The 
impact of the CTDL would therefore be dispersed widely throughout the global financial 
system, and not fall disproportionately on any single institution.
  Conclusion
To summarise, we have seen how developments in international payment and 
settlement systems, have resulted in an interrelated global network, which is lubricated 
by common technological and communication systems. It is precisely this highly 
interdependent network that makes it feasible today to unilaterally implement a 
CTDL on any currency. In order to avoid producing market distortions, the proposal is 
that the duty be set at a rate of 0.005% on all FX transactions of a specific currency. 
As well, the mechanism through which the CTDL could be efficiently identified and 
collected has been demonstrated.
We have produced highly conservative estimates of the likely annual revenue that 
would be raised through the CTDL based on unilateral implementation by the 
UK: $2.07 billion, Norway: $170 million and the euro area: $4.3 billion. When 
compared with the estimated running costs of the system, it is clear that the cost of 
administration and collection of the duty would be minimal, maximising the amount 
available for international development purposes.
Finally, we have shown that for financial institutions that would be effected by the 
CTDL, the impact would be highly diffused throughout the financial system – both 
domestically and overseas – and would amount to, for example in the UK, just $117 on 
an average FX trade of $2 million. 
For the corporate export sector, again in the UK, we see a similarly modest impact of 
0.3% of average annual profits of 10%. Clearly both the financial and non-financial 
private sector could comfortably absorb the impact of the CTDL at the rate proposed, 
as do comparable institutions in other countries and regions. 
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 3 Responding to objections 
In this section we start with the two most standard criticisms of proposals to tax 
currency transactions, then describe why the CTDL is entirely different from the Tobin 
tax, before answering most commonly raised points of issue.
  The two classic ‘avoidance’ criticisms 
● Unless every country implements a CTT at the same time the currency trade would 
re-locate to avoid paying the levy. (The so-called multilateral argument has for 
many years been used to block progress on this issue and it is important that it is 
dealt with first).
● Even if the CTT could not be avoided through re-location of the trade an adapted or 
new foreign exchange instrument would be employed to circumvent payment.
The proposed CTDL overcomes these obstacles and many historical issues for the 
following two principle reasons:
The CTDL is implemented by a country on its own currency, wherever it is traded 
in the world, as opposed to on all currencies traded in the country. This is a critical 
distinction. This is it the key to feasibility not least because it allows unilateral progress 
by one country or a group of like-minded countries. It works because (as indicated 
by the Norges bank report in Box 1, in the previous section) a country’s Central Bank 
features at the heart of trades of its own currency, wherever they are transacted in the 
world, including tax havens. The payment of a CTDL would be a legal obligation, like 
payment of any other tax. To avoid it risks an institution’s reputation not warranted for 
the sake of paying a very small levy. (This is expanded upon below).
The proposed rate of the CTDL is 200 times smaller than the original CTT proposal. 
This is clearly a key factor with an array of consequences affecting many of the historical 
concerns traditionally pitted against it. At 0.005% the proposed rate is too small to 
impact on the normal functioning of the market. Equally, it is not sizeable enough to 
warrant elaborate invention in order to avoid. At this rate, as we show below, a financial 
institution would lose more avoiding it, than it would gain. A CTDL at 0.005% is 
essentially uneconomic to avoid.
  The CTDL is not the Tobin tax
James Tobin’s original 1970s idea was for a tax to alter motivation in the foreign 
exchange market. The purpose of his tax was to impede daily currency trading29 and to 
discourage speculative activity. When he advanced his proposal the currency market 
had a daily value of $18 billion, it is now worth almost $2,000 billion per day. The rate 
he proposed was 1%, 200 times the 0.005% rate set out here, and the income was not 
designated to a specific purpose, such as development. 
 29 His intention was to ‘throw 
sand in the wheels of 
our excessively efficient 
international money markets’. 
Professor James Tobin (1978)
‘A Proposal for Monetary 
Reform’, Eastern Economic 
Journal, based on Janeway 
Lectures, Princeton, 1972.
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The CTDL is entirely different. Its raison d’etre is as a financing instrument for 
development. Its rate is designed specifically not to hamper normal market operations 
but instead to skim a tiny fraction of the volume traded. The two proposals have but one 
element in common, they are both associated with currency. The CTDL fundamentally 
differs from the Tobin tax, therefore, in that it is born of a different time, proposed at a 
different rate and designed for a different purpose.
  Historical points of issue
Would financial actors get around a CTDL by inventing new FX instruments 
or shifting their currency trading to offshore tax havens and other non-taxed 
jurisdictions?
Contrary to what critics say, incentive for avoidance of a CTDL levied on a currency 
(as opposed to the jurisdiction in which a currency trade takes place) is very limited. 
Incentive to circumvent the CTDL (or any tax) is to a large extent based on the level of 
the tax. Banks and other financial institutions will weigh the potential cost of evasion 
(penalty, suspension of licence, reputation risk and the actual technical costs of evasion 
through new legal entities and new instruments) against the costs of compliance (a tiny 
fraction of their total profits or a fractional increase in costs charged to a client). At 
the very low rate of 0.005% the incentive to get around the levy would seem to be very 
small, with the costs of avoidance appearing much higher than the cost of compliance.
The scope for avoiding the CTDL by using new instruments is also very limited. In our 
proposal we suggest that the CTDL be levied on all transactions regardless of their type 
and duration. There is little scope for using exotic financial instruments as each type of 
foreign exchange instrument serves a unique function and finding a perfect substitute 
that is not subject to the levy would be difficult. Even if inventive measures were taken 
to get around the CTDL, tax regimes in a country are not static. The collection of taxes, 
such as income tax, is a cat and mouse game in which tax payers constantly try and 
pay as little as possible and the tax authorities try to collect as much as possible. 
Moves to circumvent tax regulation can be countered by authorities keeping a watch on 
market developments. Also, due to the nature of the market, evasion is now technically 
difficult as foreign exchange transactions can be electronically traced. Moreover, 
payment systems are so important for financial stability that it is inconceivable that 
regulators will allow financial institutions to circumvent them for tax reasons or 
otherwise. What is required is the political will to implement the CTDL and provide the 
necessary legal enforcement to ensure payment and penalise avoidance. 
The scope for avoiding the levy by relocating is also limited as under our proposal 
the CTDL would apply to currencies, not jurisdictions. This means that once a country 
implements the levy, foreign exchange transactions involving its currency would be 
taxed, wherever they take place in the world, because the global settlement system 
provides ultimate recourse to the specific currency’s Central Bank. The levy can be 
collected, therefore, regardless of the geography of the trade.
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Whilst it may have been the case in the past that a CTDL could not be implemented 
unilaterally, this is no longer so. Historically, the global foreign exchange market has 
consisted of disparate parts with little or no links between them. Trades were executed 
manually by phone between counterparties, and settled through a variety of systems 
with few linkages between them. Today, the different components of the global FX 
market are built on the same technical platforms, use the same electronic messaging 
providers and trade electronically using the same systems all of which are closely 
supervised and monitored by regulators. 
Economic incidence: who pays the CTDL? How spread is the incidence? 
Would the levy change market operation?
Although relatively few in number, large international banks dominate the global FX 
market. The ‘economic footprint’ of the CTDL would, in the first instance, fall upon 
these large financial institutions that are members of the CLS Bank and the Real Time 
Gross Settlement systems (RTGS). There is little doubt that they could comfortably 
absorb the levy given the size of their profits, however, they will as far as possible pass 
on these costs to their wide range of clients in the form of a slightly higher spread. The 
CLS Bank estimates that it settles an average of 200,000 separate transactions (about 
half of the global total) every day, which gives some sense of the number of ultimate 
participants in the global FX market. The impact of the CTDL on a specific currency 
would therefore be dispersed widely throughout the global financial system, with 
minimal impact on any one institution.
In further addressing this point we will use the example of a 0.005% CTDL on sterling. 
As discussed, the CLS bank processes an average of 200,000 FX transactions every 
day. In line with the global picture, we assume that 17.5% of these have sterling on one 
side of the trade, which gives 34,000 sterling transactions in the CLS system per day. 
However, the CLS Bank settles only around half of all FX transactions, which suggests a 
global figure of 68,000 sterling trades per day. Over a year, therefore, we can estimate 
the total number of sterling transactions as being somewhere in the order of 17.7 
million carried out by tens of thousands of participants. For the 17.7 million ultimate 
transactions, the impact of the CTDL would be in the region of $117 per trade, on an 
average trade size of a little over $2 million. 
For corporations, however, the situation is clearly different. The UK exports somewhere 
in the region of $380 billion worth of goods and services per year. Based on the profit 
margins of UK companies from 1990 to 2002, we assume an average margin of 10%.30 
Ten per cent of $380 billion is $38 billion, which we take as a rough estimate of the 
annual profit of the UK’s export sector. The impact of the CTDL on UK corporates 
would be somewhere in the region of $115 million. Consequently, the impact on UK 
exporters would be just 0.3% of their annual profits, which is very small when set 
against the many other factors that influence company profitability. For example, over 
the past ten years, UK companies’ average profitability has fluctuated by up to 10% 
per year. It is therefore clearly the case that when compared to the impact of changes 
to general business conditions, and movements in indicators such as interest rates and 
the sterling exchange rate, a CTDL of 0.005% will have hardly any discernable impact. 
 30 See Citron and Walton (2002)
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Why is a CTDL at 0.005% essentially uneconomic to avoid? Would it be 
worthwhile for a financial institution to avoid the CTDL by leaving the 
CLS system? 
As has been discussed, the primary reason for establishing the CLS Bank was to 
eliminate settlement risk – as manifested with the collapse of Herstatt Bank – from 
cross-border FX transactions. In this, the CLS Bank has been remarkably successful. 
Since its launch in 2002, the system has worked virtually flawlessly. Considering the 
sums involved in daily transactions, the failure of a major international bank involved in 
the FX market, has the potential to produce a ripple of systemic risk around the world, 
with unknowable consequences for both individual banks and, ultimately, national and 
international payment and settlement systems. 
If the implementation of the CTDL did result in existing members leaving the 
CLS system, or provided a strong disincentive to joining, this would have serious 
consequences. For the CTDL to create an incentive for banks to leave the CLS system 
(again using the example of a levy on sterling), the costs of paying it would have to be 
greater than the benefits which accrue from CLS Bank membership. This is therefore 
a straight cost-benefit question. How do the two sides of the equation stack up when 
assessing a CTDL on sterling?
CLS Bank members face both fixed and variable costs as a result of their membership 
of the system. On the fixed cost side, these relate to the cost of developing IT systems, 
organisational logistics and the training of staff to enable them to function on the system. 
From the variable cost perspective, participation in the CLS Bank brings significant and 
quantifiable efficiency gains and reduction in liquidity requirements/net funding costs. 
  Efficiency gains
For participants in the CLS Bank, a key benefit has been the ability to increase FX 
volume traded, but with the same or even with fewer staff. This was illustrated in 
the results of a survey by the London-based Z/Yen Research group, which was based 
on data for 2004.31 The results show that average interbank FX volume increased 
significantly over the year, whilst average headcount fell over the same period. The 
survey demonstrates that participation in the CLS Bank has resulted in direct efficiency 
savings of 32% for participants in the system. If we assume that, on average, each 
FX transaction produces clear profit (in terms of the spread) of 1.5 basis points – a 
reasonable assumption32 – we can estimate the impact of this efficiency saving. The 
CLS system processes $2 trillion of trades every day. However, CLS Bank data includes 
both sides of each transaction, with the result that the headline figure produced must 
be halved. One and a half basis point’s worth of $1 trillion is $150 million in estimated 
profit per day. However, as pointed out above, operational efficiency gains within the 
CLS system enable participants to increase the scale of transactions by 32% with no 
impact upon operating costs. Consequently, participation within the CLS system offers 
the opportunity to increase FX profits from $150 million to $198 million per day, a 
system-wide daily profit increase of $48 million. Taken annually, this amounts to a 
direct benefit to CLS Bank participants of $12.48 billion.33
 31 See www.zyen.com for full 
copies of this survey
 32 In 2002, for example, spreads 
in inter-bank wholesale markets 
were 0.023% for the US dollar/
yen transactions and 0.021% 
for the US dollar/UK pound. 
(Spahn 2002). 
 33 Here and throughout we assume 
260 trading days per year.
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  Liquidity/Net Funding cost 
In domestic RTGS systems, the ‘G’ stands for gross rather than net. Whilst CLS Bank trans-
actions are also settled in gross form, they are funded on a net basis. The benefits this 
produces are described as follows by the CLS Bank: ‘By providing Settlement Members 
with a multilateral net position on which to base necessary daily funding rather than gross 
transaction-by-transaction funding, CLS reduces necessary funding by over 90%.’34
This feature of the CLS system brings real financial benefits to participating banks, 
which we assume fund 10% of their net funding requirements in the interbank market.35 
The 10% figure is the average funding gap faced by major UK banks from 2000–2003. 
The funding gap represents the difference between the banks’ total deposits and 
total lending.36 This shortfall must be met by external borrowing, either domestically 
or overseas. Clearly, a bank’s activities in the domestic loan and international FX 
markets are very different. However, at a group level, a liquidity saving (in terms of a 
90% reduction in net funding requirement for CLS Bank financing) frees up group-wide 
liquidity for other functions. The result is a reduction in the funding gap, and therefore 
a decrease in the quantity of funds that must be externally raised to support the bank’s 
activities. The size of this reduction, it can reasonably be assumed, directly reflects the 
reduced liquidity requirement resulting from CLS Bank membership.
The CLS Bank’s 550 members execute an average daily value of $2 trillion through 
the CLS system. Gross funding would therefore necessitate the entire $2 trillion being 
available for settlement (unlike the previously halved data, however, this is an accurate 
reflection of the real situation, since both parties to the transaction would, in the 
absence of any netting, be required to provide the full quantity as liquidity). By reducing 
the net funding requirement by 90%, however, the system only requires $200 billion to 
be made available, a saving to CLS Bank participants as a whole of $1,800 billion per 
day in liquidity. If we assume that, on average, 10% of this would have been financed 
externally, the figure ‘saved’ in this regard becomes $180 billion per day. To fund this 
daily at an overnight LIBOR rate of 3% would cost $5.4 billion over the course of a 
year (the 3% being an annualised rate and assuming 260 trading days per year). This 
therefore represents a saving to CLS Bank participants, which is a direct result of their 
participation in the system, of $5.4 billion per year.
  Comparing the quantitative benefits of CLS Bank participation, with the quantitative 
impact of the proposed CTDL
In a previous section, we have estimated the potential revenue that a CTDL could 
generate. A CTDL on sterling would generate about $2 billion, on the euro $4.5 billion 
and on the Norwegian krone about 0.17 billion. Below, we estimate the potential benefits 
that accrue to banks and other financial institutions from participation in the CLS system.
As is clear from Table 5, with the benefit of CLS Bank participation equating to almost 
$18 billion annually, the introduction of a CTDL at a rate of 0.005% would not create 
any incentive for participants to leave the CLS system to avoid the levy. Indeed, in order 
for such an incentive to exist, the CTDL would have to be levied at a much higher level 
than the rate proposed. 
 34 See About CLS: 
www.cls-group.com
 35 In reality, of course, banks fund 
their activities from diversified 
sources. However, the LIBOR 
rate offers a reasonable 
estimate of these sources in the 
aggregate.
 36 See Bank of England (2003) for 
a detailed review of the funding 
patterns of the UK banking 
sector
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Furthermore, to be acceptable to central banks (with oversight responsibilities) and 
compatible with capital adequacy norms and anti money-laundering regulations, those 
wishing to leave the CLS Bank would have to set up a parallel system with similar 
features to those described above including close regulatory supervision. Consequently, 
the CTDL could also be levied through any feasible alternative system. 
Could the CTDL be avoided with the use of derivative products?
Although the projection of CTDL income expressed in this report is deliberately 
conservative in that we do not include derivative products in the figures, it is made 
clear in Section 2 that implementing the levy on derivative transactions is also simple. 
In fact, we envisage that the CTDL would cover both traditional and the OTC FX 
derivative market. Thus the CTDL cannot be avoided by moving activities into the 
derivative market, particularly as derivative contracts are also ultimately settled in the 
traditional FX market. 
One possible exception to this relates to ‘contracts for difference’ (CFDs) and ‘non-
deliverable forwards’ (NDFs), where only the difference between the contracts (ie: the 
net position) is settled, as opposed to the gross value of the transactions. However, 
although this is the case, it is also true that financial institutions that sell CFDs and 
NDFs are usually unwilling to carry this exposure on their books, and therefore seek 
to hedge the risk these contracts entail. This hedging process can only be undertaken 
in those sectors of the FX market already covered by the CTDL, meaning that this also 
would fall within the ambit of the levy.37
There are a number of other relevant factors in this regard also. First, the CLS Bank is 
progressively increasing its abilities to settle derivatives contracts within the system. By 
2007, the CLS Bank will offer a ‘complete end-to-end’ service for the settlement of cash 
positions for NDF contracts, and for FX option premiums, further simplifying the CTDL 
collection process.
As with its other services, it is likely that the increased capacity to settle derivative 
contracts will result in significant cost savings within the CLS system. As we have seen, 
once an institution starts to participate within the CLS system, it becomes increasingly 
efficient to settle a high proportion of all their FX business within it. This applies to all 
forms of FX transactions, including derivatives.
Benefit category Annual benefit of CLS
Efficiency gains $12.48bn
Net funding requirement gains $5.4bn
Total $17.9bn
TABLE 5
Benefits of CLS 
participation for banks
 37 See Currency Transaction Taxes; 
financing development and 
enhancing stability by Sony 
Kapoor (2004) for a more 
detailed discussion of this.
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 4 Meeting needs strategically: potential uses for CTDL revenue 
The three potential areas for immediate financing we have identified have been 
specifically chosen because their delivery will provide a significant extra value in the 
achievement of many development goals. Dramatic improvements in water and 
sanitation, large investments in human resources for health to combat pandemics 
and urgent increases in financing for the UN Central Emergency Response Fund 
all reach further than they might first appear in building the architecture required to 
combat poverty in a strategic way.
  Investing in the Provision of Clean Drinking Water and 
Basic Sanitation
‘In a world of unprecedented wealth, almost 2 million children die each year for want of 
a glass of clean water and adequate sanitation. Millions of women and young girls are 
forced to spend hours collecting and carrying water, restricting their opportunities and 
their choices. And water-borne infectious diseases are holding back poverty reduction 
and economic growth in some of the world’s poorest countries.’ 38
Currently, 1.1 billion people live without access to safe water and as many as 2.6 
billion live in unsanitary squalor without access to something as basic as a pit toilet. 
This severe lack of access to the basics that we take for granted, has been directly 
implicated in the very high levels of morbidity and mortality seen in the poorest parts 
of the world. The absence of even rudimentary clean water and sanitation facilities 
is responsible for killing more than 1.8 million people, mostly children who die of 
diarrhoea every year.39 More than 200 million people are infected with schisosomiasis, 
a water-borne debilitating disease. Other water-borne diseases such as cholera and 
typhoid fever are less prevalent but have much higher mortality rates. 
All statistics and anecdotal evidence point to the failure of the development community 
to tackle the crisis in the provision of water and sanitation. Between 1990 and 2004, 
the number of people without access to clean water decreased only by 118 million 
out of a total of 1,187 million. The corresponding decrease for the number of people 
without access to improved sanitation was only 98 million out of a total of 2,710 million 
in 1990.40 Clearly, at this rate the MDG targets of halving the number of people living 
without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation (Goal 7) will not be met. 
‘The combination of safe drinking water and hygienic sanitation facilities is a 
precondition for health and for success in the fight against poverty, hunger, child 
deaths and gender inequality.’ 41 Failing to meet the targets and commitments on 
provision of proper water and sanitation facilities is undermining progress on the other 
MDGs especially those pertaining to health (Goal 6), education (Goal 2) and gender 
equality (Goal 3). Goal 4, on reducing child mortality, is unlikely to be met unless more 
children are drinking safe water and living in hygienic environments. Universal access 
 38 The 2006 Human Development 
Report, UNDP (2006)
 39 Jose Augusto Hueb (2006) 
‘Trajectories of Progress 
Achieving the MDGs and 
Achieving Coverage on Water 
and Sanitation’, WHO
 40 ibid
 41 Meeting the MDG Drinking 
Water and Sanitation Target: 
a mid-term assessment of 
progress, WHO (2004)
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to education will not be realised as long as children are too sick, or too busy collecting 
water to attend school. 443 million school-days are lost to diarrhoeal disease alone. 
The many hours spent each day on average by women and school age girls collecting 
water from distant sources are undermining progress on gender equality.
Faced with the obvious scale and seriousness of the problems caused by lack of access 
to clean drinking water and basic sanitation, donor response has been baffling. For 
bilateral donors, resources going to the water and sanitation sector have gone down 
both in absolute terms from $2.8 billion in 1995–1996 to $2.6 billion in 2003–2004 
and as a percentage of their total ODA from 8% in 1999–2000 to 6% in 2003. Total 
commitments to the sector have increased to $3.9 billion in 2004 after having fallen 
sharply from $3.6 billion in 1995–1996 to $3.1 billion in 2001–2002.42 However, this 
modest increase is far from sufficient to address the scale of the challenge. 
‘Water and sanitation are among the most powerful preventative medicines available 
to governments to reduce infectious disease.’ ‘Every $1 spent in the sector creates 
on average another $8 in costs averted and productivity gained.’ For example, water 
purification explains almost half the mortality reduction in the US in the first third of 
the 20th Century and in the UK the expansion of sanitation contributed to a 15 year 
increase in life expectancy in the four decades after 1880.43
We, therefore, echo the Norwegian government’s own words: ‘Improved water 
supplies, sanitary conditions and hygiene are crucial in the fight against poverty.’ 44 
Our recommendation is that the Norwegian government channel the proceeds of the 
CTDL into spearheading the development and financing of a global action plan on 
water and sanitation as outlined in the UNDP Human Development Report 2006. 
There is an urgent need to double the current level of spending in this critical area 
of aid provision. A long-term predictable source of finance, such as the CTDL, that 
can boost such investment would generate development benefits with positive 
repercussions for the health, education, gender and poverty MDGs.
  Investing in Human Resources for Health (HRH)
‘In global health, we are experiencing an unprecedented human resources crisis.’45 
The WHO estimates that more than 4 million doctors, nurses, managers and other 
public health workers are needed to fill the gaps in the 57 countries, mostly in 
Asia and Africa, which face the most acute crisis.46 The gaps in human resources 
and funding also mean that existing workers are overburdened, facing economic 
hardship, insecurity, crumbling infrastructure and high risks of infections to disease, 
such as HIV – all contributing to a low state of morale. ‘A serious shortage of health 
workers is impairing provision of essential, life-saving interventions such as childhood 
immunisation, safe pregnancy and delivery services for mothers and access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.’ 47
This HRH crisis is taking its toll. For example, ‘Malawi lacks many of the staff it needs 
and life expectancy has declined from 48 years in 1990 to 39 years in 2000. A properly 
resourced health service is crucial if Malawi is to cut the number of children dying 
before their fifth birthday, and the number of women dying in childbirth, and to provide 
 42 Meauring Aid For Water – has 
the downward trend in aid for 
water reversed…? 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crs/
water 
 43 The 2006 Human Development 
Report, UNDP (2006)
 44 Norwegian Action Plan for 
Environment in Development 
Co-operation, MFA (2006)
 45 Lincoln C Chen (2005) ‘Triple 
C’s in Oslo’ – consultation, 
consensus and call for action
 46 World Health Report 2006, 
WHO
 47 Global Health Workers Alliance 
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treatment for Malawians living with HIV.’ 48 The reforms to the health sector made 
under structural adjustment programs paid insufficient attention to health workers who 
were often seen as fiscal liabilities rather than core assets of the health systems. This 
severe lack of investment, barely living wage salaries, emigration by skilled staff and 
high HIV/AIDS related mortality amongst existing staff has meant that the problem 
has assumed crisis proportions. Combined with the mal-distribution of workers, 
inappropriate skill mixes and knowledge gaps, the HRH crisis threatens progress on all 
of the health related MDGs.
Compared with the bare minimum of 5 health workers per 2000 needed to hit key 
milestones such as 80% coverage of immunisations and skilled birth attendance, over 
600 million people in Sub Saharan Africa are served by fewer than one skilled worker 
per 1000 population and less than 100,000 doctors in total. To reach the MDGs, Africa 
would need to triple the number in its workforce – more than 1 million additional 
workers. There are no short cuts around HRH for achieving the health MDGs and the 
crisis will not just fade away.49
The resources mobilised through international initiatives such as the Global Fund have 
no doubt been important in focussing attention on critical issues and accelerating 
progress towards the MDGs. Especially for more recent initiatives such as UNITAID 
which focuses specifically on drugs, it is imperative to remember that without a 
properly trained and motivated workforce no diagnostics or treatments would work. 
That is why there is a need to focus on building health systems for addressing the full 
range of essential health needs of a population. 
Many donors do not appear to have got the message yet. Despite the HRH crisis 
and its widespread impact, it is much easier to attract aid towards more prominent 
interventions such as building health facilities or supplying medicines rather than 
towards the more mundane business of training and hiring health workers. Donors 
are all too ready to build clinics but still look to the recipient government to meet 
staffing costs.50 However, given the scale of the shortfall, many of the poorest recipient 
governments, especially those facing the most acute crisis are in no position to provide 
the requisite resources. The need to offer pre-service education, regular training and 
incentives such as extra rural sector allowances further exacerbate the resource gap.
While the life cycle of investments in health infrastructure is short, investments in 
human resources need to have much longer horizons. This is incompatible with the 
time horizon for most ODA disbursements, which rarely extend beyond five years. Even 
the Global Fund, which has delivery of health systems as a core mandate, only has a 
funding horizon of three to five years hardly enough to educate, train and recruit health 
workers for the long term.
The HRH crisis is crying out for a solution where donors would be able to both 
substantially increase resources allocated and commit them for much longer ‘life-cycle’ 
periods of 20–30 years. The substantial, long-term and predictable resources that can 
be mobilised by the CTDL are entirely appropriate in this setting.
 48 Hilary Benn, UK International 
Development Secretary quoted 
in DfID press release dated 
3 Dec 2004
 49 Working Together to Tackle 
the Crisis in Human Resources 
for Health (2005), quoting 
estimates from the Joint 
Learning Initiative of the Global 
Health Trust
 50 Sony Kapoor (2006) 
A Think Piece: making aid 
more effective, World Bank 
(unpublished)
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  Investing in an expanded Central Emergency Response Fund 
(CERF)
‘Not only is the world globally facing more potential disasters but increasing numbers 
of people are becoming vulnerable to hazards…’ 51 The average annual number 
of disasters reported was 55% higher and the number of people affected in poor 
countries nearly a 100% higher in 2000–2004 than during 1995–1999.52 ‘The urban 
concentration, the effects of climate change and the environmental degradation are 
greatly increasing vulnerability.’ 53
There has also been a rapid increase in the number of humanitarian emergencies some 
related directly to disasters and others less so. ‘Again and again food crises stare Africa 
in the face… We’re afraid that Africa’s food crises are becoming accepted as “normal”. 
WFP is feeding twice as many Africans in crisis than a decade ago.’ 54
Such disasters and emergencies undermine progress towards meeting the MDGs and 
the broader goal of sustainable development. A less than adequate response to tackling 
these emergencies rolls back what has taken years of development effort to achieve. 
In light of this large increase in disasters and vulnerability which puts hundreds of 
millions at risk, the global community’s response looks woefully inadequate. For 
example, the Niger crisis received only around 22% and Malawi around 30% of 
requested funds in the first month of the UN appeal. More widely, although UN 
flash appeals (for rapid onset natural disasters or sudden deteriorations in existing 
humanitarian crises) are put out within days, most of them receive less than 30% of 
requested funds in the first month.55 In these crises, time costs lives. 
Moreover, the UN estimates that in Africa alone there are more than 16 million people 
at risk in ‘neglected emergencies and under-funded crises’ where sufficient humanitarian 
aid does not materialise mainly due to a low media and political profile, or donor 
fatigue relating to protracted problems.56 For several years recently there has been a 
shortfall of about $1 billion annually in the amount needed to tackle both existing and 
new humanitarian crises effectively abandoning people to destitution, starvation or 
death once their own coping strategies and national resources have been exhausted.57
Reacting to the urgent need for increased funding in this area, a number of countries 
including Norway led the effort to re-launch the UN’s existing emergency response 
fund in the form of the CERF with a twin mandate to promote early action to meet time 
critical requirements and to strengthen the humanitarian response to under-funded 
and neglected crises. The CERF seeks to tackle disasters and other humanitarian 
emergencies by providing more money in a timely way. 
However, even the modest funding target of $450–$500 million for the CERF has not 
been met and many commentators believe that the fund should be at least double 
in size just to make up for the shortfall in funding to meet current disasters and 
emergencies.58 Though many countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands have 
pledged annual commitments, the development community’s record on meeting 
such multiyear pledges is very poor. Thus, the CERF is likely to face some of the same 
problems of unpredictable and insufficient funding that afflicts current UN humanitarian 
 51 UN-ISDR
 52 World Disasters Report 2005, 
IFRC, Table 1; and World 
Disasters Report, 2005, IFRC, 
Table 3, p196
 53 ISDR Director Salvano Briceno 
quoted on BBC: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
in_depth/3666474.stm 
 54 James Morris, WFP Executive 
Director quoted in a WFP press 
release: www.wfp.org/English/
?ModuleID=137&Key=1990 
 55 Jan Egland, Powerpoint 
presentation on ‘UN 
Humanitarian Response: 
An Agenda for Reform’, 
October 2005 
 56 OCHA, 13th October 2005, 
Campaigns, Forgotten and 
Neglected Emergencies
http://ochaonline.un.org 
 57 2005: Year of disasters, Oxfam 
Briefing Paper (2005)
 58 ibid
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appeals. This will not only undermine the development community’s ability to respond 
appropriately to emergencies but will also set back progress made on a number of 
MDGs including those dealing with health and education (Goal 6 and Goal 2).
To have a mechanism for the rapid disbursement of funds capable of effectively 
responding to the growing number of disasters and humanitarian emergencies, we 
recommend that the CERF should be expanded to at least $1 billion pa and that it be 
funded (at least in part) by a long-term predictable source of finance such as the CTDL. 
Using the CTDL to fund the CERF would be in keeping with the spirit of the innovative 
Solidarity Levy – nationally collected, internationally disbursed – to pay for an agreed 
Global Public Good. 
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 5 Conclusion
Today, lives are beginning to be saved by innovative financing for development. With 
the launch of UNITAID – primarily funded by a small aviation levy – reductions in drug 
prices will lead to a profound impact on the health of millions of people. However, the 
situation for so many of the world’s population is so fragile that this progress, though 
important, is clearly only a modest contribution. If we are to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals agreed by the UN countries in the year 2000, then it is incumbent 
on caring nations to go much further. It is vital that UNITAID is swiftly followed by a 
second development levy.
The three potential areas for immediate financing we have identified have been 
specifically chosen because their delivery will provide a significant extra value in the 
achievement of many development goals. Dramatic improvements in water and 
sanitation, large investments in human resources for health to combat pandemics 
and urgent increases in financing for the UN Central Emergency Response Fund 
all reach further than they might first appear in building the architecture required to 
combat poverty in a strategic way. It is appropriate to target the largest market of the 
world’s most powerful financial actors – the trade in money itself – to fund these weak-
spots in the infrastructure of aid provision.
It is fitting that some of the massive rewards reaped by the winners of globalisation be 
redistributed to those who have not enjoyed its benefits and are in the greatest need. 
It is the contention of this report that a small charge on currency transactions is 
best-placed to fulfil the role of the next development levy to follow on from the airline 
duty that principally finances UNITAID.
As we hope has been comprehensively shown, the work of leading city Think Tank, 
Intelligence Capital Limited, provides a blueprint of how to proceed, demonstrating 
exactly how a CTDL can be plumbed into the electronic currency trading system and is 
uneconomic to avoid at the 0.005% rate proposed.
Moreover, the levy can be implemented unilaterally by a country (or zone, ie: the 
eurozone) and cannot be avoided wherever a currency is traded in the world. The 
key traditional objections to the proposal have, therefore, been eliminated. With the 
feasibility of the proposal established, it is now a question of whether there is sufficient 
desire and political will for a country to employ a CTDL at the earliest opportunity to 
join UNITAID in saving lives.
It is clear that with all the innovative development financing initiatives that have 
recently been implemented, one country has emerged to champion the scheme and 
instigate the launch of a pilot project. It is the conclusion of this report that the time 
has come for a country to step forward and take the lead by piloting the CTDL 
thus ensuring the second development levy becomes a reality.
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  Abbreviations and acronyms
 ATL Air Ticket Levy
 BIS Bank for International Settlements
 CFD Contracts for difference
 CHAPS Clearing House Automated Payment System
 CLS Continuous Linked Settlement 
 CTDL Currency Transaction Development Levy 
 CTT Currency Transaction Tax
 DNS Deferred Net Settlement
 DvP Delivery versus Payment
 ECHO Exchange Clearing House
 FX Foreign Exchange
 IFFIm International Finance Facility for Immunisation
 LVPS Large Value Payment Systems
 MDGs Millennium Development Goals
 NDF Non-deliverable forwards
 ODA Official Development Assistance
 OTC Over-the-Counter
 PvP Payment versus Payment
 RTGS Real Time Gross Settlement
 SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
 TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Express Transfer
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Country Stocks Corp Bonds Govt Bonds Futures Detail
Argentina 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% Tax of 0.6% on all financial transactions approved by legislature March 2000
Australia 0.3% 0.15% – – Reduced twice in 1990s: currently 0.15% each for buyer and seller
Austria 0.15% 0.15% – – Present
Belgium 0.17% 0.07% 0.07% – Present
Brazil 0.3% [0.38%] 0.3% [0.38%] 0.3% [0.38%] – Tax on FX from 2% to 0.5% in 1999. Tax on stocks increased and bonds reduced 1999
Chile 18% V 18% V – – Present
China 0.5% or 0.8% [0.1%] 0 – Tax on bonds eliminated 2001. Higher rate on stock exchanges applies to Shanghai
Colombia 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% – Introduced 2000
Denmark [0.5%] [0.5%] – – Reduced in 1995, 1998. Abolished 1999
Ecuador [0.1%] [1.0%] – – Tax on stocks introduced 1999, abolished 2001. Tax on bonds introduced 1999
Finland 1.6% – – – Introduced 1997, applies only to trades on HEX electronic exchange
France 0.15% See note – Present. Sources ambiguous as to whether tax applies to bonds
Germany [0.5%] 0.4% 0.2% – Removed 1991
Greece 0.6% 0.6% – – Imposed 1998, doubled 1999
Guatemala 3% 3% See note – Present. Sources ambiguous as to whether tax applies to government bonds
Hong Kong 0.3% + $5 SF [0.1%] [0.1%] – Tax on stocks reduced from 0.6% in 1993. Tax on bonds eliminated 1999. $5 stamp fee
India 0.5% 0.5% – – Present
Indonesia 0.14% + 10% V* 0.03% 0.03% – * VAT on commissions. Introduced 1995
Ireland 1.0% – – – Present
Italy [1.12%] – – – Stamp duties eliminated 1998
Japan [0.1%], [0.3%] [0.08%], [0.16%] – – Removed 1999
Malaysia 0.5% 0.5% 0.015% [0.03%] 0.0005% Present
Morocco 0.14% + 7% V 7% V 7% V – Present
Netherlands [0.12%] [0.12%] 0 – 1970–1990
Pakistan 0.15% 0.15% – – Present
Peru [0.1%], 0.08% + 18% V [0.1%], 0.08% + 18% V [0.1%], 0.08% – Financial transaction tax implemented 2003, reduced to 0.08% 2005. VAT Present
Philippines [0.5%] + 10% V – – – VAT present
Portugal [0.08%] [0.04%] [0.008%] – Removed 1996
Russia 0.8%† + 8% V – – – †0.8% on secondary offerings. Present
Singapore 0.05% + 3% V – – – Reduced 1994, eliminated 1998. VAT present
South Korea 0.3% [0.45%] 0.3% [0.45%] – – Reduced 1996
Sweden [1%] – – – Removed 1991
Switzerland 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% – Present 0.3% on foreign securities, 1% new issues
Taiwan 0.3% [0.6%] 0.1% – 0.05% Reduced 1993
UK 0.5% – – – Present
US 0.0012% [0.0033%] – – $0.1 Present, reduced in 2002
Venezuela 0.5% [1%] – – – Reduced May 2000
Zimbabwe 0.45% V – – – Present
APPENDIX
Security 
transaction
 taxes around 
the world
Source: Pollin (2005)
V = VAT on trade costs
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